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Globalization is proceeding at a rapid pace. It is therefore not surprising that several so-
cial sciences continue to explore its various implications. Public economists are particularly
interested in how global economic integration aects public policies; consequently, a large
literature on this question has emerged over the years within the eld of Public Economics.
Several authors argue that deepening economic integration may lead to the dissolution of
the welfare state and cause social and political instability (Rodrik, 1997; Rudra, 2002). On
the one hand, economic integration might increase international tax competition and thus
cause lower tax rates on mobile rms (Lee and McKenzie, 1989; Devereux et al., 2008). As a
consequence, the tax burden could shift from mobile (capital) to immobile (labor) production
factors, and fewer resources might be available for redistributive programs. On the other hand,
globalization is often associated with an increase in the cross-border mobility of individuals,
which is expected to additionally strain the welfare state. First, because the wealthy and
highly qualied can more easily defy high personal tax rates through emigration; second,
because generous redistributive transfers might attract the poor and less qualied (Sinn,
2003).
The empirical implication of these arguments is that tax revenues and the amount of
redistributive transfers will decline with deepening globalization. But even though these
theoretical arguments are persuasive, the available empirical evidence is ambiguous. Shelton
(2007) nds that trade openness has had no eect on total government expenditures for a
panel of 100 countries over the 1970-2000 period.1 Slemrod (2004) shows that there is a
negative correlation between corporate tax rates and openness, even though total tax receipts
seem to have been unrelated to openness. Rodrik (1998) and Ram (2009) nd that more open
countries have higher government expenditures.2
This empirical ambiguity is to some extent expected given that globalization may have
conictive eects on scal policy. Therefore, the individual eects of globalization could
cancel each other out at the level of total government expenditures. In response to this
problem, several authors have used less aggregated data, and explored whether globalization
has had an eect on the composition of the public budget. Dreher et al. (2008) study in a
notable contribution this question with a panel of 108 countries over the 1970-2001 period.
However, they nd that the composition of public expenditures has not been aected by
globalization.
1Note that the terms globalization and trade openness are used interchangeably in this literature. Glob-
alization is, however, a broader concept than trade openness, and additionally implies, inter alia, a global
convergence of cultures and political systems. For a more detailed discussion of the proper meaning of global-
ization see Bhagwati (2004) and Dreher et al. (2008).
2Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), however, present evidence that the positive correlation between openness
and government size is driven by the fact that smaller countries have a larger public sector and are also more
open than larger countries. Benarroch and Pandey (2008) oppose the causal conclusions in Rodrik (1998) by
arguing that his models suer from a reversed causality problem.
1Even though Dreher et al. (2008) conduct a thorough analysis, it is possible that their
level of aggregation is still too high. They consider relative shifts in, for example, total
education and social security expenditures. The drawback of considering such broad spending
categories is that the subtler eects of globalization on public budgets might be missed. That
is, globalization might have aected the composition of expenditures within broad budget
categories, while not changing their relative importance. With respect to public spending
on education, for example, globalization could have aected the distribution of education
expenditures between lower and higher education, while not aecting the relative importance
of education expenditures as a whole vis-a-vis other expenditure categories.
Therefore, we explore in this study whether globalization has an eect on the composition
of public education expenditures. More specically, we analyze how globalization aects the
allocation of public education expenditures on primary, secondary, and tertiary programs.
A noteworthy precursor to our study is Ansell (2008). He constructs a model that is based
on the insight that industrialized and developing countries have dierent factor endowments.
He derives that globalization will aect the returns to factors of production dierently in
industrialized and developing countries (see the next section for a more detailed discussion).
His model leads to the conclusion that governments in developing countries will attach more
importance to primary and less to tertiary education with deepening globalization, while those
in industrialized countries will pursue the opposite policy. Even though he also presents some
empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis, this particular research question is only one
of several in his paper and not fully explored.3
We extend Ansell's work in various directions. First, while taking into account that glob-
alization might aect factor prices in industrialized and developing countries dierently, we
additionally acknowledge the contributions of the literature on international tax competition
(surveyed above) in our theoretical model. We argue in the model that globalization increases
tax competition and thereby reduces the government's ability to redistribute income through
the tax-transfer system. This, in turn, causes governments to rely increasingly on educa-
tional policies for redistributive purposes.4 Second, we also extend Ansell's empirical analysis
by using a more sophisticated measure for the extent of globalization, applying panel data
techniques, and controlling for potential endogeneity.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we develop a simple
theoretical model to analyze the relationship between globalization and the composition of
education expenditures. We test the implications of the model with panel data covering 86
countries over the 1999-2006 period in section 3. In section 4, we conclude.
3Other notable theoretical contributions on the impact of globalization on educational policies are Anderson
(2005), Anderson and Konrad (2003), Haupt and Janeba (2009), and Viaene and Zilcha (2002). Apart from
Ansell (2008), there is, to our knowledge, no further empirical study on the eect of globalization on the
composition of education expenditures.
4As discussed in Hanushek et al. (2003), the idea of using educational policies as an alternative means of
redistribution is fairly standard.
22 The model
2.1 Framework
Consider a country that is populated by two groups: individuals who are endowed with a low
level of ability aL (group L), and individuals who are endowed with a high level of ability
aH > aL (group H). These dierent levels of ability may originate from dierences in inborn
intelligence, or in the skills and opportunities that an individual \inherits" by being raised
within a particular social class.
With respect to the masses of the two population groups, we assume that M[L] > M[H].
There are thus more low- than high-ability individuals, which is probably a realistic assump-
tion for most countries. We also normalize M[H] = 1.
Each individual i 2 I; I = fL;Hg produces an output yI by combining her endowed
ability aI with a government-provided productivity-enhancing public good gI. We assume





I ; 8i 2 I = fL;Hg with 0 <  < 1.
In our context, it is appropriate to think of gI as dierent types of education expenditures.
That is, gL could be thought of as spending for lower education. A high value for gL would
then signal the government's willingness to increase the income of the low-ability individuals
by improving their educational opportunities. Conversely, gH can be thought of as higher
education expenditures, which increase the productivity of the high-ability individuals, but
are of no direct use to the low-ability individuals.
Even though expenditures for lower education might in reality also directly benet the high-
ability individuals, any such benets are likely to be smaller than those they would obtain
through higher education expenditures. The assumption that the high-ability individuals do
not benet at all from lower education and the low-ability individuals not at all from higher
education is a simple way to capture the fact that dierent societal groups prefer dierent
compositions of the public budget. Incorporating cross benets into the model would not
qualitatively aect the argument we want to make, but would add several variables to the
algebra.
It is apparent that industrialized countries have, inter alia, a relative abundance in high-
skilled labor, whereas developing countries are relatively abundant in low-skilled labor. This
implies that in a world of closed economies, wages for low-skilled labor should be relatively
high in industrialized and relatively low in developing countries, while wages for high-skilled
labor should be relatively low in industrialized and relatively high in developing countries.
One important eect of globalization is that rms in industrialized countries gain access
to the low-skilled labor pool in developing countries, for example by relocating their produc-
tion plants. This increases the demand for low-skilled workers in developing countries, while
decreasing it in industrialized countries. Therefore, the returns to low-skilled labor are likely
3to increase in developing and decrease in industrialized countries with deepening globaliza-
tion. Conversely, the returns to high-skilled labor will decrease in developing and increase in
industrialized countries with globalization.
Consequently, we need to account for this argument, which resembles the factor price
equalization theorem from the Heckscher-Ohlin model, in our model. We do this by modeling
the price at which the output of individual i can be sold as a function of globalization, which
we denote with A. The price for the output of an individual i of type I = fL;Hg is thus
given as pI = pI[A]. We assume that pH > pL holds both in industrialized and developing
countries. What diers in our model between industrialized and developing countries is the
sign of dpI=dA, the (marginal) eect of globalization on the output prices. It follows from our
previous discussion that dpH=dA > 0 and dpL=dA < 0 holds for industrialized countries. In
developing countries, the signs should be reversed, i.e., dpH=dA < 0 and dpL=dA > 0. While
this is admittedly a highly simplied application of the insights from the Heckscher-Ohlin
model,5 it captures the important result that international trade leads to a equalization of
factor prices (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2005).
The market income of the individual i is then given by




I ; 8i 2 I = fL;Hg: (1)
Even though taxes can in principle only be collected after production has taken place, it
is reasonable to assume that education expenditures are nanced through taxation because
any productivity enhancing government expenditures have to be paid eventually through tax
revenue.6
The government's budget constraint is given by
T = M(L) gL + gH + R: (2)
This equation states that a share T   R of total tax revenues T is intended for education
expenditures. The remaining portion R > 0 of the tax revenues is used for redistribution
through cash transfers.
Since the low-ability individuals constitute the majority of the population, we assume that
the government is exclusively interested in the welfare of this population group. This is a
reasonable approximation of reality for democratic countries, and it might also be appropriate
for certain types of autocratic states such as populist regimes.
We equate the welfare of an individual with her net-consumption level. The government
has, in principle, two decision variables through which it can inuence an individual's net-
5In the standard exposition of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, for example, international trade leads only
indirectly to an equalization of factor prices by causing a convergence of prices for traded goods. In our model,
however, we do not distinguish between factor and output prices for the sake of brevity. See Krugman and
Obstfeld (2005) and Leamer (1995) for a more detailed discussion of the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
6See Alesina and Rodrik (1994) for a similar approach.
4consumption level. It can, rst, use education expenditures gI, and, second, use direct trans-
fers to redistribute income. We assume that the low-ability individuals are exempt from
taxation. The high-ability individuals have to pay a proportional tax t on their market
income. Total tax revenues are thus given by
T = tH: (3)
where H denotes the total income of the high-ability individuals as a group (i.e., the tax













Note that the total income of the high-ability individuals is equal to their average income
because we have normalized the mass of this group to unity.
Given the above assumptions, the governments's objective function, i.e. the net-consumption
of a representative individual belonging to the group of the low-ability individuals, is
max
gL;gH;t




The net-consumption of a low-ability individual is thus given by her own market income L,
and a per-capita transfer that is equal to the part of the tax revenues, R, used for the transfer
payments divided by the population mass of the low ability individuals.
2.2 Mobility and the optimal tax rate
It follows immediately from the objective function that the government should always choose
the highest possible tax rate. However, in reality, the government cannot freely choose the
tax rate because it has to take into account that high tax rates reduce the tax base. Emigra-
tion of the richly-endowed is one of the most important explanations for an upper limit on
redistribution through the tax-transfer system. Therefore, the equilibrium tax rate depends
on the extent of international mobility, which we presume in the following to be related to
the level of globalization.
We assume that these mobility decisions are made after production has taken place. This
implies that a high ability individual, if she chooses to emigrate, takes the income she has
already earned to the foreign country, but does not generate any additional income there.
To model these mobility decisions formally, let us presume that a high-ability individual
will be indierent between remaining in the country and emigrating if the following condition
holds:
(1   t)H =
 
1   tF   x[A]

H; (6)
5with tF denoting the tax rate if the individual would emigrate (the \foreign" tax rate), and
x[A] denoting the costs that have to be incurred in the case of emigration. These costs can
be thought of as the monetary representation of the \psychological" stress of losing contact
with one's acquaintances, or as the costs of relocating physical assets. They are incurred as
a fraction of income because more wealthy individuals usually own more assets and will thus
have higher relocation costs.7
The costs are modeled as a function of the extent of globalization A with dx=dA < 0. This
assumption captures the fact that one eect of globalization is the lowering of transportation
cost, which implies that it becomes easier to visit one's acquaintances in the home country, or
to relocate physical assets. Another aspect relates to the spread of English as a modern Lingua
Franca and the emergence of a global culture, both of which might reduce the psychological
costs of moving to a foreign country.
Solving equation 6 for the equilibrium domestic tax rate gives t = tF +x[A]. It is straight-
forward to show that dt=dA = dx=dA < 0. That is, the equilibrium tax rate is a (decreasing)
function of the extent of globalization, i.e. t  t[A] (it is also a function of the foreign tax
rate, but we suppress this parameter in the following). This is a reasonable result given that
globalization is often associated with intensifying tax competition and a decline in the tax
burden of the wealthy.
2.3 The composition of public education expenditures
Taking into account equations 2 and 3, and that the eventual tax rate is a function of the
level of globalization, the objective function of the government can be rewritten as follows
max
gL;gH
Vt=t[A] = L +
1
M[L]
(t[A]H   (M[L]gL + gH)); (7)
with the constraint t[A]H  M[L] gL + gH.
Dierentiating the objective function with respect to the gi and assuming an interior solu-







with [A] = pH[A]=pL[A].
This equation implies that in equilibrium, the relative amount of resources allocated to
higher education will increase with the equilibrium tax rate, the relative value of the output
prices, and the relative value of the endowment of the high-ability individuals.
7We realize that this argument for treating the emigration costs as proportional to income does not equally
well apply to the costs due to `psychological" stress, but the proportionality assumption might still be appro-
priate because high-ability individuals usually have a more \valuable" network of acquaintances in the home
country.
8This requires, in particular, that the tax rate in equilibrium t
[A] is suciently large
6When international mobility is prohibitively costly and therefore the extent of globalization
low, the tax rate can be set at t = 1. The government would then choose an allocation of
gH and gL such that the relative share of gH is given by gH=gL = [A]1=(aH=aL). Thus, the
market income of the high-ability individuals will be relatively large. After redistribution,
however, the income distribution would be reversed. In fact, the high-ability individuals will
be completely expropriated.
This conclusion is of course unrealistic if it is taken literally. It does, however, mirror a
particular pattern of scal policy that can be observed in several OECD and many developing
countries. In the typical European welfare state, for example, higher education is provided
either free of charge or is highly subsidized by the government, even though the majority of
the electorate does not directly benet from these expenditures. At the same time, average
and marginal personal income tax rates are relatively high. At rst sight, this pattern of scal
policy makes little sense. According to our model, however, this policy might maximize the
consumption possibilities of the income strata that have a low level of ability if tax competition
is very low.
As argued by Poutvaara and Kanniainen (2000), such a social consensus to nance higher
education publicly may break down once the highly skilled can emigrate more easily. This can
also be shown formally in our model by dierentiating the rst order condition in equation 8















with  = (1=)(t[A][A])
(1 )= (aH=aL).
Since  is unambiguously positive, the sign of expression 9 depends upon (dt[A]=dA)[A])+
t(d[A]=dA). First, note that we have shown in section 2.2 that dt=dA < 0 because global-
ization intensies tax competition. The sign of d[A]=dA, however, is less obvious. In fact,
as argued above, it diers between industrialized and developing countries.
In developing countries, globalization decreases the returns to high-skilled and increases
that to low-skilled labor. This implies that d=dA < 0. Therefore, since both dt=dA < 0
and d=dA < 0, expression 9 will be unambiguously negative in developing countries. In other
words, developing countries will shift their educational policies in favor of lower education with
deepening globalization.
In industrialized countries, on the other hand, globalization increases the returns to high
skilled and reduces that to low-skilled labor. This implies that d=dA > 0. Therefore, the
sign of expression 9 is indeterminate because dt=dA < 0. In other words, governments in
industrialized countries face conictive incentives with respect to their educational policies.
Whether globalization will induce them to shift their educational programs toward lower or
higher education, or not at all, is therefore an empirical question. Given that industrialized
7countries face conictive incentives, however, one reasonable hypothesis is that globalization
will be \neutral" for the composition of education expenditures in this group of countries.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Empirical model and data
In this section, we test the implications of our theoretical model by estimating several variants
of the following general empirical model
y = i + !t +  x +  Globalization +  Globalization  Dev + ; (10)
where y is a measure for public expenditures for either primary, secondary, or tertiary educa-
tion, i country xed eects, !t year xed eects, x a vector of control variables (see below),
and  the error term.
In order to test the implications of our theory, we include a measure for globalization
and its interaction with a dummy variable that is 1 for \developing" countries9. We are
interested in the estimate for  and , the coecients attached to the globalization variable
and its interaction with the developing country dummy:  is the eect of globalization in
industrialized countries, whereas  +  is its eect in developing countries. Note that we do
not have to explicitly include the developing country dummy into this model because of the
country xed eects.
The theoretical model leads two related but distinct empirical predictions. First, the fact
that the eect of globalization on the composition of education expenditures is ambiguous in
industrialized but unambiguous in developing countries implies that with deepening global-
ization, developing countries will increase their spending for primary education and reduce
their spending for tertiary education at least as much than industrialized countries. This
implies that the estimate for  should be weakly positive (i.e.,   0) for primary and weakly
negative (i.e.,   0) for tertiary education. We label this prediction the Relative Educa-
tion Hypothesis (REH) because it refers to the relative eect of globalization in developing
countries as compared to industrialized countries.
The theoretical model also leads two a second prediction which we label the Absolute Edu-
cation Hypothesis (AEH). The fact that equation 9 in the theoretical section is unambiguously
negative for developing countries suggests that these countries will increase their spending for
9 Any classication of countries as industrialized or developing is of course arbitrary. We take a conservative
approach and classify the wealthy \Western" countries cum Japan and South Korea as industrialized. This
implies that even OECD countries such as Turkey or Poland are classied as \developing". Therefore, the
term developing as used in this paper should not be understood as being synonymous with, for example, the
Least Developed Countries (LDC). It should rather be understood as encompassing all countries except the
most wealthy. See table 7 in the appendix for a complete list of how we have classied the countries in our
sample.
8primary and reduce that for tertiary education with deepening globalization. The testable
implication of this theoretical result is that the marginal eect of globalization in developing
countries,  + , should be signicantly positive for primary and signicantly negative for
tertiary education.
Even though the model does not oer a clear prediction for secondary education expendi-
tures, we also consider the impact of globalization on this type of educational program. With
regard to this type of education expenditures, we presume that the eect of globalization
will be less pronounced than for primary and tertiary education in both industrialized and
developing countries.
Our preferred measure for public education expenditures for the three types of educational
programs, i.e. the dependent variables in equation 10, are the expenditures per student,
normalized through division by GDP per capita.
We prefer these measures to using \budget shares" (i.e., primary, secondary, and tertiary
education expenditures as share of total education expenditures) because we must scale gov-
ernment spending on the three dierent educational programs by the number of students in
these programs. This is done automatically when we use expenditures per student as depen-
dent variable. We conduct, however, further below a sensitivity analysis by using the share
of primary, secondary, and tertiary education expenditures in total education expenditures as
dependent variable. A concise description of the dependent variables and their sources can
be found in table 1.
With respect to the control variables in equation 10, our measure of globalization is the
KOF-index developed by Dreher (2006). The KOF-index is based on three sub-indexes which
capture the extent of economic, social, and political globalization. These three sub-indexes
are aggregated into one single measure of globalization. We prefer this measure to the simple
trade openness variable (exports plus imports divided by GDP) because it takes into account
that globalization is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that has broader implications than only
to increase international trade. In view of the research questions in this study, an appropriate
measure of globalization should, inter alia, additionally capture to what extent English is
used as a second language since the ability to communicate in the current Lingua Franca will
directly impact international mobility.
We use a diverse set of additional control variables, which are are listed in table 1. Most
importantly, we include total education expenditures per student as percent of GDP per
capita. This variable has to be controlled for since our aim is to investigate how the relative
importance of primary, secondary, tertiary education expenditures (i.e., the composition of
education expenditures) has changed with globalization.
We additionally include (i) the size of the population in order to capture economies of scale
in the provision of public goods; (ii) total government expenditures as share of GDP in order
to control for the economic importance of the public sector; (iii) GDP per capita in order to
9capture how a country's income level is related to the structure of education expenditures; and
(iv) a measure of the government's ideology in order to control for systematic partisan biases
in education expenditures. The ideology variable is an index that is 1 when the government
is left-wing with respect to economic policy, and else 0.10
One important variable for which do not explicitly control is the amount private education
expenditures. Unfortunately, private education expenditures are dicult to measure for the
poorer countries in our sample. However, the propensity of a country to nance education
privately can be understood as a relatively time-constant country-specic characteristic. For
example, private education expenditures have traditionally been and continue to be more
important in Anglo-Saxon than in Continental European countries. We therefore use the
country xed eects to control for the importance of private education expenditures.
Apart from these control variables, we use several additional variables either as controls in
the robustness checks, or as instruments, or both. These are, rst, the gross enrollment rates
for primary, secondary, or tertiary educational programs and, second, the population shares
of the age groups relevant for each of the three types of educational programs. In addition,
we also consider the amount of development aid paid to certain countries. We explain the
rationale for using these variables in the respective sections; they are concisely described in
table 1.
Our unbalanced dataset covers 86 countries, both developing and developed, over the 1999-
2006 period. Summary statistics for all variables used in the subsequent regressions are
collected in table 5; a list of the countries that are considered in this study can be found in
table 7. Both tables are in the appendix.
Inter alia, the summary statistics in table 5 reveal that the average expenditures per student
as percent of GDP per capita are much higher for tertiary (64.48 %) than for either primary
(16.29%) or secondary programs (22.73%). The same holds with respect to the variability in
the three expenditure types as revealed by the standard deviations.
3.2 Baseline models
We collect the baseline results in table 2. We estimate a set of four models for each of
the dierent types of education expenditures. All models include the full set of economic
and political control variables, and country and year xed eects (results for these are not
reported). For hypothesis tests, we always use robust standard errors. At the bottom of the
table (in the row labeled Glob. at Dev=1), we report the marginal eect of globalization in
developing countries (i.e., the estimate of  + ) for those models in which we include the
interaction between globalization and the developing countries dummy.
10Note that this ideology variable is derived from the DPI dataset. Whereas this dataset distinguishes
between right, center, left, and other governments, we use, for compactness, a 0-1 classication. We code
left-wing governments as 1 and all other governments as 0.
10Table 1: Definition and source of variables
Label Description Source
Dependent variables
Primary/Student Primary education expenditures per student di-
vided by GDP per capita
UNESCO Institute for
Statistics
Secondary/Student Secondary education expenditures per student di-
vided by GDP per capita
UNESCO Institute for
Statistics
Tertiary/Student Tertiary education expenditures per student di-
vided by GDP per capita
UNESCO Institute for
Statistics
Control variables and instruments
Total/Student Total education expenditures per student divided
by GDP per capita
UNESCO Institute for
Statistics
Globalization KOF index of globalization Dreher (2006)
Population Population size Penn World Table 6.3
Gov. share Government expenditures as share of GDP Penn World Table 6.3
GDP p. c. (real) GDP per capita Penn World Table 6.3
Ideology Index of government ideology with respect to eco-
nomic policy, left-wing=1, else 0
Own calculation based
on DPI 2006 Dataset
(Beck et al., 2001)
Aid Development aid /GDP World Development In-
dicators
Primary enrollment Gross enrollment rate in primary education World Development In-
dicators
Secondary enrollment Gross enrollment rate in secondary education World Development In-
dicators
Tertiary enrollment Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education World Development In-
dicators
















Primary education expenditures as share of total





Secondary education expenditures as share of total





Tertiary education expenditures as share of total
education expenditures (logit transformation)
UNESCO Institute for
StatisticsThese four models successively impose fewer assumptions on the data, thereby making the
estimates more robust while simultaneously decreasing their eciency. If all models produce
qualitatively similar results, however, we should be reasonably condent that our conclusions
are valid.
The rst model for each spending category (entitled FE 1) includes the globalization vari-
able but not its interaction with the developing countries dummy. By not including the
interaction eect in this model, we eectively assume that globalization has the same eect
in both industrialized and developing countries.
The second model (entitled FE 2) includes the interaction eect and thus takes into account
that the marginal eect of globalization might dier between industrialized and developing
countries.
The third model (entitled IV), while controlling for all variables that are considered in
the second model, takes additionally into account that total education expenditures and the
expenditures for primary, secondary, and tertiary education are by construction simultane-
ously determined. We deal with this endogeneity problem by instrumenting total education
expenditures. The IV estimator, while being less ecient than OLS, leads to consistent es-
timates. We consider this as our preferred model because it is probably the most reasonable
compromise between consistency and eciency.
In the fourth model (entitled IV & CL), re-estimate of the third model, but conduct the
hypothesis tests on the basis of clustered standard errors. This model is therefore robust to
arbitrary forms of autocorrelation, but may be particularly inecient.
We use as instruments for total education expenditures in the third and fourth model (i) the
gross enrollment rates and (ii) the population shares of the relevant age groups for the three
educational programs (school age population). To minimize the potential for endogeneity
problems, we use in each set of regressions for one type of educational program the enrollment
and population shares in the other two types. For example, we use as instruments in the
models with secondary education expenditures as dependent variable the gross enrollment
rate in primary and tertiary education, and the population shares of the age groups relevant
for primary and tertiary education. The only exception is the model with primary education
expenditures. Here, the Hansen J test for overidentication rejects the null when the gross
enrollment rate in tertiary education is used as an instrument. We therefore exclude this
variable from our set of instruments in the models with primary education expenditures as
dependent variable.
The theoretical rationale for using the dierent enrollment rates and population shares as
instruments is that they are likely to be correlated with total education expenditures.11 As
11Note that the direction of the correlation is not trivial. While a higher overall gross enrollment rate
should be positively correlated with higher total education expenditures, this is not necessarily true for the
individual gross enrollment rates in the three educational programs. That is, a higher gross enrollment rate in
a lower-level educational program implies that the gross enrollment rate in the next higher program tends to
be smaller, for example because of repeaters. Since education expenditures per student are on average larger
12indicated by the overidentication tests in table 2, the instruments perform well with respect
to this test in all models. The relevance tests, however, indicate that the set of instruments
may be weak in the model for secondary education expenditures when clustered standard
errors are used.
According to the results in table 2, the estimate for  is signicantly positive in the model
for primary, insignicant in the model for secondary, and signicantly negative in the model
for tertiary education expenditures when the interaction term is not included (the FE 1 mod-
els). These results seems to suggest that globalization is positively associated with primary,
unrelated with secondary, and negatively related with tertiary education expenditures.
The remaining models in table 2, however, reveal that these results are driven by the
eects of globalization in developing countries. The interaction eect is, as predicted by
the REH hypothesis, always positive for primary and always negative for tertiary education
expenditures. In fact, the interaction eect is even signicantly dierent from 0 (this, however,
is not necessary to conrm the theory which only predicts that the interaction eects will be
weakly positive or negative, respectively). The signs of the interaction eects thus conrm
Hypothesis REH.
The second hypothesis, AEH, is also conrmed by our results. As the row entitled Glob.
at Dev=1 shows, the marginal eects of globalization in developing countries,  +, is signif-
icantly positive in the model for primary and signicantly negative in the model for tertiary
education expenditures. The eect of globalization in industrialized countries,  (when the
developing country dummy is 0), on the other hand, is always insignicant. In other words,
globalization has apparently led to a relative increase in funding for primary and a reduction
in funding for tertiary education in developing countries, while displaying a \neutral" eect
in the industrialized world.
Note also the the marginal eect of globalization in the model for secondary education
expenditures has always, both for industrialized and developing countries, a value that is
in between the estimates for the marginal eects in the models for primary and tertiary
education expenditures.
With respect to the other control variables, we nd that an increase in education expen-
ditures increases spending for all three educational programs since the coecient for this
variable is consistently positive. Apart from total education expenditures, only the popula-
tion and GDP per capita variable are sometimes signicant. When countries become more
prosperous, they seem to spend more on primary and secondary education. When countries
become more populous, on the other hand, they seem to spend less on primary education.
at higher levels of education, a higher gross enrollment rate at some lower level is therefore not necessarily










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this section, we investigate the robustness of our results. In the rst set of robustness
checks, we divide our sample in industrialized and developing countries and estimate the
baseline model separately for each of the two groups of countries. In doing so, we allow not
only the coecient on the globalization variable, but also all other coecients to vary between
industrialized and developing countries.
The results are collected in table 3. For each type of educational program, we estimate two
individual models. First, we estimate a pooled OLS model to exploit both the between and
within variation (since pooled OLS models take the between variation into account, they can
be considered as an additional robustness check). Thereafter, we include country xed eects
and re-estimate the model while only using the within-variation. All models also include year
xed eects, and hypothesis tests are conducted with robust standard errors. Total education
expenditures are instrumented with the same instruments as in the baseline models.
First, note that the signs of the coecient are always the same in the pooled OLS and the
xed eects models. The signicance levels, however, tend to be lower in the xed eects
models, but the t-statistics are in general relatively high. Note also that the overidentication
test sometimes performs poorly in the pooled OLS models while it always performs well in
the xed eects models. This indicates that the pooled OLS models probably suer from an
omitted variables bias.
Overall, the results from these robustness checks conrm the baseline results. In developing
countries, globalization apparently leads to higher primary education expenditures while it
seems to have a negative eect on tertiary education expenditures. Conversely, globalization
seems to have no eect on education expenditures in industrialized countries as indicated by
the insignicant coecients in the xed eects models. In other words, the baseline results
are conrmed by this set of robustness checks.
In table 4, we report the results from a second set of robustness checks. In these regressions,
we study whether the results in the baseline regressions are sensitive to (i) outliers, (ii) to
using \budget shares" (primary, secondary, and tertiary education expenditures as share of
total education expenditures) instead of spending per student as dependent variable, and (iii)
to controlling for development aid. The specication is similar to the baseline models in the
sense that we include the interaction of the globalization with that of the developing country














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eIn the models entitled Outliers, we re-estimate our preferred model (IV in table 2) after
dropping all observations for which a Grubbs test suggest that they are an outlier.12 We use
a signicance level of 95% in the models for secondary and tertiary education expenditures.
This reduces the number of observations in the model for tertiary education expenditures by a
large amount, and in the model for secondary education expenditures somewhat moderately.
In the model with primary education expenditures, however, no observations are regared as
outliers at a signicance level of 95%. We therefore reduce the signicance level sucessively
for primary education expenditures. But even at a signicance level of 50 %, only two
observations are considered as outliers for this type of expenditures, which suggests that
most countries spend similar per capita amounts (scaled by their respective GDP per capita)
for primary education.
In the models entitled Budget, we use the alternative measure for public spending on the
three types of educational programs. The dependent variables in these models are the bud-
get shares. Since the budget shares are constrained to be between 0 and 100, using them
as dependent variables violates the assumptions for OLS to be appropriate. We therefore
transform the dependent variables by applying the logistic function before conducting the
estimations.
Since the number of students in the three educational programs do not appear at the
left-hand side in the Budget models, we have to adapt the right hand-side of equation 10
by explicitly including both the population shares of the relevant age groups and the gross
enrollment rates. This is necessary because the \demand" for a particular type of educational
spending will increase with the number of student and their enrollment rates.
In the models entitled Aid, we additionally include into the baseline model the amount
of development aid divided by GDP as an additional control variable. The rational for in-
cluding this variable is that donor countries may insist that developing countries use aid for
certain types of educational programs. According to Bloom et al. (2006), for example, inter-
national donor agencies have generally emphasized lower and deemphasized higher education
in developing countries.13
As in the baseline models, we need to instrument total education expenditures per student
in the Outliers and Aid models. We do that by using the same instruments as in the baseline
models. In the Budget models, we do not use instruments and thus report the simple xed
eects estimates. All models include year xed eects and use robust standard errors for
hypothesis tests.
The results for this set of robustness checks are collected in table 4. They largely conrm
the baseline results. The interaction eect is generally positive in the primary and negative
12The Grubbs test has been implemented by Couderc (2007) in Stata.
13Note that our original data for the aid variable had missing observations for \wealthy" countries. We
replaced these missing observations with 0 to ensure that we can include these countries in the regressions.
Note furthermore that several developing countries in our sample had a negative value for the development aid
variable in some years. We replaced these values with 0, too.
17Table 4: Globalization and education expenditures in 1999{2006, Robustness checks, Various
specifications
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Outlier Budget Aid Outlier Budget Aid Outlier Budget Aid
b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t
Education exp. 0.346** 0.275* 1.345*** 1.831*** 0.159 3.345
(2.534) (1.748) (3.008) (4.164) (0.352) (1.279)
Population -0.038** -0.001 -0.048** 0.030 0.001 0.094* -0.235*** -0.001 0.055
(-2.160) (-1.257) (-2.344) (0.639) (1.538) (1.821) (-4.125) (-0.697) (0.125)
Gov. share 0.107** 0.003 0.049 -0.206* -0.013* -0.151 0.294 -0.014* -2.723
(2.099) (0.668) (0.658) (-1.745) (-1.944) (-0.936) (0.656) (-1.656) (-1.257)
GDP p. c. 0.086 0.001 0.173 0.150 -0.002 0.501* 0.548 0.009 -1.049
(0.963) (0.138) (1.355) (0.962) (-0.298) (1.718) (1.469) (0.831) (-0.408)
Ideology -0.074 -0.009 -0.149 -0.320 0.021 0.049 -0.679 -0.003 1.994













Aid 0.050 -0.195 -5.326*
(0.707) (-0.938) (-1.650)
Globalization -0.118 0.003 -0.097 0.045 -0.001 0.191 0.453 0.020** -0.222
(-1.645) (0.474) (-1.230) (0.405) (-0.195) (1.152) (1.549) (2.404) (-0.278)
Glob.  Dev. 0.232*** 0.006 0.274*** -0.216* -0.003 -0.288 -0.856** -0.025** -3.057**
(2.947) (0.899) (2.942) (-1.665) (-0.439) (-1.492) (-2.125) (-2.412) (-2.127)
Glob. at Dev=1 0.114*** 0.009** 0.177** -0.171** -0.005 -0.097 -0.404* -0.006 -3.279**
N 442 445 445 423 444 436 392 435 443
F 14.098 1.904 12.244 14.929 1.490 9.794 12.677 1.530 5.764
RMS error 1.272 0.104 1.538 1.898 0.110 2.891 5.444 0.153 30.602
Overidentication test 0.538 0.985 0.018 0.313 0.004 0.155
Relevance test 0.001 0.001 0.033 0.039 0.000 0.001
1 Stars indicate signicance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***)
2 t-statistics in parentheses
3 Cross-section and year xed eects included in all models except models entitled with Average
4 The marginal eect of globalization in developing countries is reported in the row entitled Glob. at Dev=1
5 The p-values for the overidentication and relevance tests are reported at the bottom of the tablein the tertiary education expenditures model. The only exception is the Budget model for
primary education expenditures, where the interaction eect is close to 0 (but still positive).
On the other hand, the Budget model performs well for tertiary education expenditures.
Overall, we consider this as a conrmation of the REH hypothesis.
The AEH is also largely conrmed. The coecients in the row entitled with Glob. at
Dev=1 are always positive for primary education expenditures and always negative for ter-
tiary education expenditures. For tertiary education expenditures, however, the coecient is
insignicant in the Budget model, but still negative. Note also that the overidentication test
is rejected in the Outlier model. This is probably due to the large reduction in the sample
size.
Overall, both sets of robustness checks largely conrm the baseline results and thus rearm
the validity of the REH and AEH hypotheses.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed whether globalization is related to the composition of public
education expenditures. We rst developed a theoretical model which suggested that glob-
alization causes governments in developing countries to adjust public education expenditures
away from higher and towards lower education. For industrialized countries, on the other
hand, the model suggested an ambiguous eect.
Based on these theoretical results, we formulated two empirical hypotheses. The Relative
Education Hypothesis stated that developing countries will increase their spending for primary
education and reduce their spending for tertiary education at least as much as industrialized
countries. The Absolute Education Hypothesis, on the other hand, stated that developing
countries will increase their spending for primary and reduce that for tertiary education with
deepening globalization. In the empirical part of our paper, we found robust evidence, i.e.,
in the baseline models and in sensitivity analyses, for both hypotheses.
Our results thus show that globalization aects the structure of public education expendi-
tures. It apparently shifts the composition of education expenditures towards lower education
in developing countries, which might, in the long run, benet the poor by increasing their
productivity. We therefore conclude that governments in developing countries react to glob-
alization by taking steps that mitigate, to some extent, its potentially harmful distributional
consequences.
In industrialized countries, on the other hand, globalization seems to have been largely
neutral for the composition of public education expenditures. Since the distributional conse-
quences of globalization for low-skilled individuals in industrialized countries are apparently
not alleviated by shifts in the composition of public education expenditures, additional mea-
sures might be necessary (Sinn, 2005).
19An issue that deserves further attention is whether the pattern between globalization and
public education expenditures that we have observed in the empirical investigations is indeed
due to the \transmission channels" considered in our theoretical model. While the model
provides one explanation for the empirical pattern, there might be competing arguments. A
more complete test our our theory should, for example, explicitly show that globalization (i)
has reduced the tax burden of the high-skilled while (ii) increasing, with an appropriate time
lag, the market income of the low-skilled in developing countries due to the shift in education
expenditures.
This, however, is dicult with the available data. With respect to the rst point, the
problem is to nd an appropriate measure of the tax burden of rms and individuals. While
this is already a contentious issue for industrialized countries, the situation is even more
dicult for developing countries for which the underlying data on taxes is sketchy. With
respect to the second point, the unavailability of disaggregated data on the market income of
the high- and low-skilled is, especially in developing countries, the main problem. Finding an
appropriate strategy to dierentiate between dierent theoretical arguments for the observed
empirical pattern is therefore a promising avenue for future research.
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22Appendix
Table 5: Summary statistics
Variable Variance Mean SD Min Max Obs.
Education exp. overall 20.87 6.68 7.20 47.60 448
between 6.77 8.08 41.07
within 1.86 13.07 27.47
Population overall 36.43 107.56 0.19 1093.56 448
between 119.11 0.19 1057.67
within 3.38 -17.11 72.32
Gov. share overall 17.02 6.52 7.32 53.43 448
between 7.38 8.07 42.62
within 1.37 8.42 27.83
GDP p. c. overall 16.38 11.64 0.65 45.69 448
between 11.58 0.67 42.79
within 1.24 10.60 21.86
Ideology overall 0.31 0.46 0 1 448
between 0.41 0 1
within 0.22 -0.54 1.17
Aid overall 2.10 5.50 0.00 54.03 428
between 7.05 0.00 46.01
within 0.91 -5.70 10.12
Globalization overall 68.44 14.11 28.43 92.19 448
between 14.90 30.45 91.68
within 2.07 59.56 76.11
Primary/Student overall 16.29 5.50 5.20 37.30 448
between 5.42 6.20 32.95
within 1.86 6.74 30.78
Pop. share overall 9.95 4.03 3.51 19.40 448
primary between 4.22 3.85 19.17
within 0.42 7.87 11.50
Gross enroll. overall 104.13 10.64 56.19 154.44 446
primary between 12.54 57.98 145.70
within 3.36 87.91 120.36
Secondary/Student overall 22.73 10.96 6.90 100.20 448
between 12.53 8.83 82.87
within 3.03 8.63 40.07Pop. share overall 10.93 3.10 5.85 20.00 448
secondary between 3.22 6.37 19.65
within 0.32 9.57 11.90
Gross enroll. overall 87.94 28.32 10.32 161.66 445
secondary between 31.75 11.89 153.72
within 5.12 58.53 113.73
Tertiary/Student overall 64.48 106.22 5.10 1141.50 445
between 130.76 8.20 845.47
within 30.41 -98.82 360.51
Pop. share overall 8.25 1.64 5.21 13.73 445
tertiary between 1.55 5.77 13.11
within 0.33 6.82 9.67
Gross enroll. overall 40.02 24.83 0.89 93.22 436
tertiary between 25.13 1.07 87.00
within 4.90 20.17 63.73
Primary/Total overall 31.93 11.40 7.80 71.20 445
edu. exp. between 12.38 8.83 69.00
within 2.11 20.19 44.90
Secondary/Total overall 37.67 8.31 10.30 57.70 444
edu. exp. between 8.89 10.90 54.83
within 2.27 26.74 46.57
Tertiary/Total overall 20.27 6.84 4.20 40.30 435
edu. exp. between 6.94 5.20 36.63
within 2.08 11.88 33.03
Table 6: Cross-correlation table
Variables Primary/ Secondary/ Tertiary/ Primary/ Secondary/ Tertiary/
Student Student Student Total Total Total
edu. exp. edu. exp. edu. exp.
Primary/Student 1.000
Secondary/Student 0.422 1.000
Tertiary/Student 0.009 0.509 1.000
Primary/Total -0.054 -0.004 0.314 1.000
Secondary/Total edu. exp. 0.071 0.201 -0.316 -0.671 1.000
Tertiary/Total edu. exp. 0.102 0.052 0.132 -0.387 -0.109 1.000Table 7: Included countries
Argentina (D) Hungary (D) Oman (D)
Australia Iceland Panama (D)
Austria India (D) Paraguay (D)
Azerbaijan (D) Iran (D) Peru (D)
Barbados (D) Ireland Philippines (D)
Belgium Israel (D) Poland (D)
Belize (D) Italy Portugal
Benin (D) Jamaica (D) Romania (D)
Bolivia (D) Japan Rwanda (D)
Brazil (D) Kenya (D) Samoa (D)
Bulgaria (D) Korea Senegal (D)
Burkina Faso (D) Kuwait (D) Slovak Republic (D)
Burundi (D) Latvia (D) Slovenia (D)
Cameroon (D) Lesotho (D) South Africa (D)
Cape Verde (D) Lithuania (D) Spain
Chad (D) Madagascar (D) Swaziland (D)
Chile (D) Malaysia (D) Sweden
Colombia (D) Mali (D) Tajikistan (D)
Costa Rica (D) Malta (D) Thailand (D)
Cote d`Ivoire (D) Mauritania (D) Trinidad &Tobago (D)
Cyprus (D) Mauritius (D) Tunisia (D)
Czech Republic (D) Mexico (D) Turkey (D)
Denmark Mongolia (D) Ukraine (D)
El Salvador (D) Morocco (D) United Arab Emirates (D)
Estonia (D) Namibia (D) United Kingdom
Finland Nepal (D) United States
France Netherlands Uruguay (D)
Greece New Zealand Vanuatu (D)
Guyana (D) Norway
1 Countries classied by us as \developing" are indicated with a \D" in parentheses
2 See footnote 9 for an explanation of the criteria according to which a country is classied
as developing or industrializedCESifo Working Paper Series 
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